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The Meaning of Capacity and Consent in
Sexual Assault: R. v. G.F.
Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet*
1. Introduction
The Criminal Code provisions dealing with sexual assault have
been amended in a piecemeal fashion several times since the major
reforms of 1982, which replaced the offences of rape and indecent
assault with a three-tiered sexual assault offence.1 Many of these
reforms were brought forward in response to particular judicial
decisions that provoked controversy and concern.2 In most cases,
*

1.

2.

Professors, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
The authors would like to thank Deborah Trotchine for her diligent research
assistance on this article and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council for funding this research.
See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 246.1 [Criminal Code 1970], as
amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences
and other offences against the person and to amend certain other Acts in
relation thereto or in consequence thereof, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, s. 19
[1982 Amendments].
In the 1982 Amendments, ibid., s. 265(4) was a response to R. v. Pappajohn,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 14 C.R. (3d) 243 (Eng.) (S.C.C.)
[Pappajohn cited to SCR]. The 1992 reforms were instigated by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia’s decision in R. v. Letendre (1991), 5 C.R. (4th)
159, 1991 CarswellBC 421, 14 W.C.B. (2d) 281 (B.C. S.C.) (where Hood J.
found the accused not guilty of sexual assault, noting that “[t]he mating
practice, if I may call it that, is a less than precise relationship. At times no
may mean maybe, or wait awhile” at para. 64). At the same time, the s. 276
provisions were amended to respond to R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577,
66 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.). See An Act to amend the
Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38 [1992 Amendments]. The
third party records provisions were enacted in response to R. v. O’Connor,
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 44 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). See An Act
to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence
proceedings), S.C. 1997, c. 30. The 2018 reforms were in response to R. v.
Ghomeshi (2016), 27 C.R. (7th) 17, 2016 CarswellOnt 4246, [2016] O.J. No.
1487 (Ont. C.J.) and the trial decision in R. v. Al-Rawi (2018), 359 C.C.C.
(3d) 237, 44 C.R. (7th) 148, 2018 CarswellNS 60 (N.S. C.A.) [Al-Rawi]. See
An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to
make consequential amendments to another Act, S.C. 2018, c. 29 [2018
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new provisions were added without removing or amending related
provisions already in place. What remains is a set of provisions that
do not work together as a coherent whole.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. G.F.,3 a
case involving the sexual assault of a highly intoxicated teenage girl by
an adult common-law couple, is the latest in a series of decisions from
the Supreme Court of Canada attempting to explain how the various
provisions regarding consent, non-consent and incapacity fit
together. It is also the most recent in a series of decisions that reveal
how sexual assault law generally has been distorted by the court’s
determination that HIV nondisclosure be prosecuted as a form of
sexual assault.4 In this comment on GF, we examine the latest attempt
by the Supreme Court to synthesize the piecemeal amendments to the
Criminal Code in the context of consent and capacity to consent to
sexual activity. We argue that the line of cases following the leading
case of R. v. Ewanchuk5 – from R. v. Cuerrier,6 to R. v. Hutchinson7 to
GF – while purporting to uphold the robust definition of consent
endorsed in Ewanchuk, have in fact considerably weakened the
meaning of consent and correspondingly limited the doctrine of
incapacity to consent as well. The Supreme Court has moved away
from its focus on the subjective state of mind of the complainant
required in Ewanchuk, to treating participation or even acquiescence
as consent, and then looking to see if that supposed consent should be
vitiated for one of a number of recognized reasons. This approach
limits the scope of non-consent and ignores the statutory requirement
that, for consent to exist at all, it must be truly voluntary.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Amendments]. The exception to this pattern is the 1987/88 reforms to the
provisions involving children, which flowed from the Report of the
Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (Ottawa: Supply
and Services Canada, 1984) (Chair: Robin F. Badgley). See An Act to amend
the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1987, c. 24.
R. v. G.F. (2021), 404 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 71 C.R. (7th) 1, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375
(S.C.C.) [GF SCC].
For further discussion on this topic, see generally Isabel Grant, “The
Complex Legacy of R. v. Cuerrier: HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions and
Their Impact on Sexual Assault Law” (2020), 58:1 Alta L Rev 45 [Grant,
“Complex Legacy”]; Lise Gotell & Isabel Grant, “Non-Consensual Condom
Removal in Canadian Law Before and After R. v. Hutchinson” (2021), 44:2
Dal LJ 439.
R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 22 C.R. (5th) 1
(S.C.C.) [Ewanchuk cited to SCR].
R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 18 C.R. (5th) 1
(S.C.C.) [Cuerrier cited to SCR].
R. v. Hutchinson, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 346, 308 C.C.C. (3d) 413, 8 C.R. (7th) 255
(S.C.C.) [Hutchinson].
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We begin with an introduction to the current structure of the
Criminal Code provisions and the cases that have led to so much
confusion. We move to examine the court’s analysis of capacity to
consent and then of consent in GF, demonstrating how these analyses
are a significant departure from Ewanchuk. Finally, we conclude with
a discussion of the strongest part of the majority’s reasons in GF – its
analysis of the proper scope of appellate review of assessments of
credibility.

2. The Statutory Background
The Criminal Code is now a hodgepodge of provisions dealing with
consent to sexual contact enacted at different times. In 1982, when the
old offences of rape and indecent assault were repealed and replaced
with the offence of sexual assault,8 escalating in severity depending on
the degree of additional violence or injury, no definition of consent or
non-consent was included in the Criminal Code. Just as with the old
offences that had been in force for the first 90 years of the Code’s
existence,9 Parliament seemed content to leave the definition of the
element of non-consent to the courts. At the time of the 1982 reforms,
courts typically defined a lack of consent in terms of the expected
physical or verbal resistance by the complainant, placing the onus on
her to make her lack of willingness evident to the accused.10
The only exception to the absence of a legislative definition was s.
265(3) of the Criminal Code,11 which added a number of ways in
which no consent is obtained, for the purposes of all assault-based
offences, not just sexual assault.
265.(3) No consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does
not resist by reason of
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other
than the complainant;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or
to a person other than the complainant;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority.12
8.

See Criminal Code 1970, supra note 1, s. 246.1 (added pursuant to the 1982
Amendments, supra note 1, s. 19).
9. See generally The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29; Criminal Code 1970,
supra note 1.
10. See Pappajohn, supra note 2 (affirming that a “firm oral protest” is
“sufficient to deny any reasonable grounds for belief in consent” at 154).
11. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 745 [Criminal Code] (previously
Criminal Code 1970, supra note 1, s. 244(3), added pursuant to the 1982
Amendments, supra note 1, s. 19).
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In most respects, this list simply codified the common law. Even
under the old offence of rape, the Code provided that rape was proven
by sexual intercourse with a woman not the wife of the accused, if
committed without her consent or “with her consent if the consent is
extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm.”13 The shift in language
between these two formulations is interesting. The offence of rape
spoke of a situation in which the complainant consents in fact, but the
consent is legally invalidated by the threats. In the 1982 revisions, the
language of “no consent is obtained” in s. 265(3) suggests that a lack
of resistance that is the product of threats should not be considered
consent at all. This shift reflects a change in attitudes as to what
consent requires – that it is not a mere act of acquiescence or even
participation, but rather a mental state that requires genuine
agreement. Indeed, even some rape cases decided in the final years
of that offence reflected this evolution in understanding. For
example, in R. v. Anderson,14 decided in 1981, the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal approved of the following passage from the trial
judge’s jury charge:
Now, what do we mean by consent? Consent involves knowing what is
being proposed and voluntarily permitting it to be done. Now, mere
submission does not necessarily imply consent, for a woman may
consent to intercourse because of threats or fear of bodily harm and a
consent extorted in that way is no consent, at all.15

Although non-consent was an element of all of the sexual assault
offences added to the Code in 1982, there was no statutory definition
of consent until 1992. In 1992, Parliament passed s. 273.1, which
defines consent and sets out a number of factors that are relevant to a
consent determination.16 Section 273.1(1) begins by telling us that
consent is “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in
the sexual activity in question”. There is no definition of non-consent,
which is the actual element of the actus reus for most sexual offences.
The current version of s. 273.1(2), which applies only to sexual
12. Criminal Code, supra note 11, s. 265(3).
13. Criminal Code 1970, supra note 1, s. 143(b)(i).
14. R. v. Anderson (1981), 92 A.P.R. 623, 48 N.S.R. (2d) 623, 1981 CarswellNS
275 (N.S. C.A.) [cited to APR].
15. Ibid., at 628.
16. Also in 1992, the reasonable steps provision was added to s. 273.2, limiting
the circumstances in which an accused could raise a mistaken belief in
consent. See 1992 Amendments, supra note 2, s. 1. In 2018, Parliament
reinforced the affirmative consent standard in the context of an honest
mistaken belief, allowing the defence only where voluntary agreement has
been affirmatively expressed through words or actively by conduct. See 2018
Amendments, supra note 2, s. 19.
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offences and not to the assault offences, sets out ways in which “for
the purpose of subsection (1), no consent is obtained”:
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other
than the complainant;
(a.1) the complainant is unconscious;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any
reason other than the one referred to in paragraph (a.1);
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by
abusing a position of trust, power or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement
to engage in the activity; or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity,
expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to
engage in the activity.17

Subsections (a.1) and (b) were added in 2018, replacing the
previous s-s. (b), which simply referred to incapacity to consent,
without singling out unconsciousness.18 As with s. 265(3), this list is
not meant to be exhaustive of the circumstances in which no consent is
obtained.19 The 2018 amendments also added a provision that
consent must be present at the time the sexual activity takes place,
effectively codifying part of the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. A.
(J.).20
We are left with a patchwork of provisions that have been added at
different times that differ in scope – some applying to all assaultbased offences and others applying only to sexual assault offences.
Some of the provisions appear to overlap. For example, s. 265(3)
includes “the exercise of authority”, while s. 273.1(2) refers to
“abusing a position of trust, power or authority”.
The 1992 definition of consent as “voluntary agreement” sits
uneasily with the implication in s. 265(3) that submission or lack of
resistance could be equated with consent in some circumstances.
Despite clear statements in later case law, most notably in R. v.
Ewanchuk,21 rejecting the equating of mere submission with consent
17. Criminal Code, supra note 11, s. 273.1(2).
18. See 2018 Amendments, supra note 2, s. 19. See also Grant, “Complex
Legacy”, supra note 4 at 73-74 (for a discussion of the feminist debate over
these amendments. It was already clearly established in law that an
unconscious complainant was incapable of consent, but what was not clear
was where the line was for a conscious but impaired complainant).
19. See Criminal Code, supra note 11, s. 273.1(3) (where it is stated that
“[n]othing in subsection (2) shall be construed as limiting the circumstances
in which no consent is obtained.”).
20. R. v. A. (J.), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 1, (sub nom. R. v. J.A.) 84
C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) [JA].
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in any circumstances, the Code was never updated to remove these
references from the introductory words of s. 265(3). In recent cases,
the Supreme Court has tended to approach these provisions as if they
were enacted at one time as one coherent code, rather than
acknowledging that our sexual assault law is the product of
accretion and reflects a disinclination on the part of Parliament to
consider how proposed changes fit within the overall framework and
whether evolving case law may mean that some existing provisions
need to be rewritten or removed entirely.

3. The Jurisprudential Background
To complicate matters further, there are two lines of case law that
have been operating in parallel that have recently come more directly
in conflict. First, we have a body of case law – starting from
Ewanchuk, to JA,22 R. v. Barton23 and R. v. Goldfinch24 – asserting a
robust standard of affirmative consent and rejecting any notion of
implied consent or advance consent. Most notably, Ewanchuk
required the Crown to prove only that the complainant did not
subjectively want the sexual activity to take place in order to establish
the actus reus of non-consent.25 The complainant is not required, as a
matter of law, to do or say anything to indicate a lack of agreement. In
other words, the starting point is no longer that a woman consents
unless she expressly says otherwise.
Simultaneously, however, we have a line of cases dealing with HIV
nondisclosure in the context of sexual assault – beginning with R. v.
Cuerrier, which was decided months after Ewanchuk, and
culminating in R. v. Mabior26 – that focus on the circumstances in
which a deception will be recognized as invalidating consent. These
two lines of cases intersected in R. v. Hutchinson where the doctrine of
fraud, as developed in relation to HIV nondisclosure, leaked into
sexual assault law in a different context. GF, the subject of this
comment, is the court’s attempt to reconcile these lines of authority,
which sit uneasily with one another.
Subsection 265(3)(c) deals with fraud negating consent and has
21. Supra note 5 at 356.
22. Supra note 20.
23. R. v. Barton, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 579, 376 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 54 C.R. (7th) 231
(S.C.C.) [Barton].
24. R. v. Goldfinch (2019), 380 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 55 C.R. (7th) 215, 435 D.L.R. (4th)
1 (S.C.C.).
25. See Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 348.
26. R. v. Mabior, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584, 290 C.C.C. (3d) 32, 96 C.R. (6th) 1
(S.C.C.) [Mabior].
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been the site of much debate over the criminalization of people who
do not disclose their HIV-positive status to their sexual partners. In
R. v. Cuerrier,27 the court held that a fraudulently induced consent
under s. 265(3)(c) vitiates an otherwise valid consent. The court went
beyond the common law definition of fraud as limited to the identity
of one’s sexual partner or the sexual nature of the activity and
extended the statutory definition to cases where the deception poses a
“significant risk of serious bodily harm” to the complainant.28
The three sets of reasons in Cuerrier do not actually consider
whether to understand fraud as operating to prevent any real consent,
because the complainant’s agreement was not truly voluntary, or
whether to think of fraud as vitiating an otherwise valid consent for
policy reasons. Vitiation is not a term that appears in either s. 273.1, s.
265(3) or anywhere else in the sexual assault provisions of the
Criminal Code; it is a judicial construct first introduced to sexual
assault law (but not explained) by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Cuerrier.29 To the contrary, the Criminal Code uses the language “no
consent is obtained”.
The distinction between vitiating consent and finding no consent
existed is important for several reasons. Saying that a deception
vitiates consent means that the complainant did consent, but we are
deciding her consent was invalid as a matter of law. This tells us
important information about what consent includes. The more
situations considered to be vitiating, the lower the threshold for
consent, which in turn makes proving non-consent more challenging.
There is also a danger that vitiated consent will be seen as a less serious
violation of the complainant’s bodily integrity than a situation where
no consent exists at all. This may impact the approach to sentencing,
creating a hierarchy of sexual offences that is not reflected in the
structure of the Code. It also invites Parliament and the courts to
narrowly circumscribe the vitiating circumstances, as the Supreme
Court has done with fraud, so as not to detract from the
complainant’s ostensible autonomy. The law may tell the
27. While Cuerrier, supra note 6 involved a charge of aggravated assault, the
majority made clear the accused could also have been convicted of
aggravated sexual assault. See Grant, “Complex Legacy”, supra note 4 at
49, note 25.
28. Cuerrier, supra note 6 at 434, cited in Hutchinson, supra note 7 at para. 34.
29. Vitiation of consent for reasons of public policy was discussed in the context
of physical assault in R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 454, 7
C.R. (4th) 233 (S.C.C.), where it was held that consent to serious hurt or
non-trivial bodily harm intentionally inflicted in the context of a fist fight
was not legally valid.

2022]

Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault

85

complainant that she consented even where she subjectively did not
want the sexual activity to take place.
Hutchinson was the high point of shifting the analysis away from
the absence of consent by leaving more room for factors that could
vitiate consent. Hutchinson dealt with a man who had poked holes in a
condom for the explicit purpose of impregnating his unknowing
girlfriend.30 The court had to decide whether this deception negated
the complainant’s consent to the sexual activity in question from the
outset, or whether instead it operated like HIV nondisclosure to
vitiate an otherwise valid consent. Apparently driven by the principle
of restraint, the majority chose the latter approach, one of fraud
vitiating consent,31 whereas the minority held that the complainant
had never consented to sex with a sabotaged condom.32 The majority
set out a very narrow two-step approach to the content of consent. To
satisfy the first step, which GF refers to as “subjective consent”,33 the
complainant need only agree to the specific physical act, knowing of
its sexual nature and the specific identity of her partner. That is all
subjective consent requires. The second step is to consider whether
any factors vitiate that consent on public policy grounds.
If the complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt
about the lack of consent, the second step is to consider whether there are
any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent. Section 265(3)
defines a series of conditions under which the law deems an absence of
consent, notwithstanding the complainant’s ostensible consent or
participation. . . Section 273.1(2) also lists conditions under which no
consent is obtained. For example, no consent is obtained in circumstances of coercion (s. 265(3)(a) and (b)), fraud (s. 265(3)(c)), or abuse
of trust or authority (ss. 265(3)(d) and 273.1(2)(c)).34

In this passage, the majority treats the factors in s. 265(3) as
vitiating factors, incorrectly describing the provision as speaking to
situations of “ostensible consent or participation”. In fact, s. 265(3) is
broader in that it applies to a submission or lack of resistance caused
by one or more of the four listed factors – this does not require any
participation by the complainant and does not speak to her mental
state at all, which is, according to Ewanchuk, what determines
consent.
The limits on fraud developed in the HIV nondisclosure context
meant that deliberately sabotaging a condom would only be
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Hutchinson, supra note 7 at para. 2.
See ibid., at para. 6.
See ibid., at para. 79.
GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 4.
Hutchinson, supra note 7, at para. 4 [citation omitted].
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criminalized where there was a significant risk of serious bodily harm
to the complainant. The Hutchinson majority held that one consents
to a sex act and not to how that sex act is performed. In other words,
one consents to sexual intercourse but not to sexual intercourse with
(or without) a condom.35
The temptation to utilize fraud in Hutchinson may have been based
on the unusual fact situation, which was a clear example of a
deception that caused bodily harm to the complainant. However,
there are a growing number of cases on condom refusal. These cases
do not involve bodily harm to the complainant, but rather harm to her
autonomy, in the sense of her choice about the kind of sexual activity
in which she will participate. Nonconsensual condom refusal refers to
the situations where men ignore their sexual partners’ insistence on a
condom.36 The logical extension of Hutchinson is that a man who
openly disregards his partner’s insistence on a condom, without a
deception, is not guilty of sexual assault because condom use does not
go to consent. The conclusion in Hutchinson that how the sexual
activity takes place is not part of “the sexual activity in question” has
also led to arguments that the amount of force used in sexual activity
is also not part of consent. In R. v. Barton, the Criminal Lawyers’
Association of Ontario tried to extend this logic to its absurd extreme
by arguing that one only consents to the narrowly defined sexual
activity and not to the amount of force with which it is perpetrated, an
argument that has dangerous implications, especially for the most
marginalized women.37 Thus we emerged from Hutchinson with the
possibility that all the factors in ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2) do not negate
the presence of consent but rather vitiate it after the fact, substantially
narrowing the definition of non-consent.
The reason all of this background is necessary to understand GF is
because incapacity is one of those factors listed in s. 273.1(2).
Hutchinson opened up the possibility of an argument that incapacity
also vitiates an otherwise valid consent rather than preventing the
complainant from ever forming consent. If incapacity only vitiates an
otherwise valid consent, a complainant who is incapable of
consenting may be found to have given subjective consent
nonetheless. That was the central issue addressed by the Supreme
Court in GF, although the decision goes further, and elaborates on
35. See ibid., at para. 55.
36. See Gotell & Grant, supra note 4 at 5-12 (for a discussion of the social science
literature on nonconsensual condom refusal).
37. See Barton, supra note 23 (Factum of the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of
Ontario) at para. 13. See also Grant, “Complex Legacy”, supra note 4 at 54;
Gotell & Grant, supra note 4 at 18, note 91.
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how the limits on consent set out in ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2) operate
together.

4. R. v. G.F.
(a) The Factual Background
The complainant, CR, was a 16-year-old girl who went on a
camping trip with her family and her mother’s coworkers. The
accused, GF and RB, were two of those coworkers, a common-law
couple who were more than twice the complainant’s age.38 The
complainant testified that GF, the male accused, provided her with
large quantities of alcohol over the course of the evening. The alcohol
made her sick, she vomited repeatedly, and she eventually went to lie
down in the accused’s trailer and fell asleep. She testified that she
awoke to GF pulling her pants off and telling RB to perform oral sex
on her. CR testified that she “kept blacking out and going in and out
of it.”39 She was crying and groaning and said “stop” a number of
times.40 Justice Karakatsanis described what happened from the
complainant’s testimony as follows:
The complainant testified that she felt dizzy, intoxicated, scared, and
repeatedly told the respondents to stop. G.F. told her to “be quiet”. She
did not call for help because she was sick, confused, and felt out of
control. She testified that she did not feel able to make a choice of
whether or not to participate. She tried to push away for a bit but got tired
and then “just went along with it”. Eventually, she passed out again. She
disclosed the assault to her aunt the next day.41

One of the accused, GF, testified that he had found the
complainant and RB in the trailer engaging in sexual activity and
that the complainant had invited him to join them.42 He testified that
the complainant was not as intoxicated as she claimed and that she
was an active and enthusiastic participant in the sexual activity.43 He
testified that he received assurances from the complainant at least
seven times that she was consenting.44 The other accused, RB, did not
testify.
38. See R. v. G.F. (2019), 378 C.C.C. (3d) 518, 55 C.R. (7th) 437, 146 O.R. (3d)
289 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 14 [GF ONCA], reversed (2021), 404 C.C.C. (3d) 1,
71 C.R. (7th) 1, 459 D.L.R. (4th) 375 (S.C.C.).
39. Ibid., at para. 6.
40. Ibid., at para. 7.
41. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 9.
42. See GF ONCA, supra note 38 at para. 12.
43. See GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 11.
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The testimony of the complainant provided evidence of incapacity,
but it also provided evidence that the complainant did not consent.
She testified that she was highly intoxicated to the point of illness,
going in and out of awareness, and unable to choose whether to
participate, all of which supported the claim of incapacity. She also
testified that she did not want to engage in sexual activity with her
mother’s coworkers; she wanted to sleep and recover from her
intoxication. Although non-consent is measured subjectively and
does not require resistance or objection, she testified that she did say
stop and tried to push them away. This case therefore raised the
relationship between incapacity and non-consent. However, the
Crown at trial argued this case solely on the basis of incapacity.45
The trial judge accepted the complainant’s testimony and
concluded that she was incapable of consenting. He also held that
GF’s testimony was “unbelievable” 46 and “riddled with
inconsistencies.”47 The trial judge’s reasons did blur incapacity and
non-consent on occasion, but in ways that were largely
inconsequential given his findings of fact and credibility. The
accused appealed their convictions on the basis that the finding of
incapacity was unreasonable because the fact that the complainant
remembered the sexual activity meant she was capable of
consenting.48
The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected the argument that a
finding of incapacity was unreasonable.49 However, the court went
on to hold that the trial judge had erred in not first dealing with nonconsent, and only moving to capacity if there was at least a reasonable
doubt that the complainant did consent, in a manner akin to the
approach endorsed in Hutchinson. Thus, the Court of Appeal
conceptualized incapacity as a vitiating factor that need only be
considered where there is at least a reasonable doubt that the
complainant subjectively consented. In considering how a trial judge
should address evidence where both capacity and consent are at issue,
the Court of Appeal stated:

44. See ibid., at para. 10.
45. See generally R. v. Foster, 2016 CarswellOnt 12943, [2016] O.J. No. 4256,
2016 ONSC 3465 (Ont. S.C.J.).
46. Ibid., at para. 71.
47. Ibid., at para. 73.
48. See GF ONCA, supra note 38 at para. 23.
49. See ibid., at para. 53.
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He or she should first consider whether the Crown has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to sexual contact.
If the complainant did not consent, then there is no ostensible consent
which is vitiated by lack of capacity.50

Following the Court of Appeal’s approach, a finding that the
complainant was incapable of giving consent could coexist with a
finding that she did in fact consent.
The Court of Appeal also relied on our earlier research that
considered incapacity and non-consent in the context of sexual
assaults against women with intellectual disabilities.51 In that work,
we argued that if the complainant was asserting that she did not want
the sexual activity to take place, the court should focus first on that
claim of non-consent, and in doing so, potentially avoid an inquiry
into the complainant’s capacity to consent to sexual activity with the
accused. When the basis for a capacity inquiry is the complainant’s
disability, there is a real risk, demonstrated in our research, that the
focus will be on the complainant’s perceived limitations rather than
the violence she says was done to her.52 This order of analysis is not
based on the idea that incapacity vitiates consent; it is designed to
avoid declaring a woman with a disability “incapable” where that is
not necessary for conviction.
We argued in our previous work that incapacity could coexist with
non-consent – as the evidence in this case demonstrates.53 A
complainant may be both aware that she does not want to be
touched and incapable of appreciating who is touching her or what
acts are being carried out on her body. However, the Court of Appeal
effectively held the reverse, holding that incapacity could coexist with
subjective consent – a position we had flatly rejected.

50. Ibid., at para. 41 [emphasis added].
51. See Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints
of Women with Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken
Belief” (2007), 52:2 McGill LJ 243 [Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity,
and Mistaken Belief”], cited in ibid., at para. 47.
52. See Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief”, ibid., at
272. As will be discussed below, a finding of incapacity based on mental
disability is very different and potentially much more far-reaching than a
finding of incapacity based on intoxication.
53. This conclusion was contrary to the interpretation given to an earlier Court
of Appeal for Ontario case, R. v. Jensen (1996), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 430, 47 C.R.
(4th) 363, 90 O.A.C. 183 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed [1997] 1 S.C.R. 304, 112
C.C.C. (3d) 384, 5 C.R. (5th) 378 (S.C.C.), which was read by the Court of
Appeal in GF to say that a finding of incapacity and a finding of non-consent
were mutually exclusive. See GF ONCA, supra note 38 at para. 48, note 2.
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(b) The Majority Decision in GF
(i) Capacity
The majority decision of Justice Karakatsanis in GF,54 supported
by the minority of Justices Brown and Rowe, rejected the
interpretation of incapacity as a vitiating factor that negates an
otherwise valid consent. Rather, capacity is a precondition to the
complainant being able to form that consent. A finding of incapacity
should rule out the possibility of finding that the complainant
voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question:
where the complainant is incapable of consenting, there can be no
finding of fact that the complainant voluntarily agreed to the sexual
activity in question. In other words, the capacity to consent is a necessary
– but not sufficient – precondition to the complainant’s subjective
consent. As I shall explain, this is distinct from circumstances where a
person may provide subjective consent that is not legally effective, due
to, for example, duress or fraud.55

Even though capacity is a precondition to consent, the majority
held that capacity need not necessarily be dealt with first, before nonconsent, as there may be circumstances where non-consent can be
demonstrated even where the complainant is incapable of consenting:
when a trial engages both the issues of whether the complainant was
capable of consenting and whether the complainant did agree to the
sexual activity in question, the trial judge is not necessarily required to
address them separately or in any particular order as they both go to the
complainant’s subjective consent to sexual activity.56

Thus, while a finding that a complainant was incapable of consent
cannot coexist with a finding that she consented, it can coexist with a
finding that she did not consent. This is because the capacity to
consent is a higher threshold than the capacity to withhold consent. A
complainant may be capable of saying no to sexual activity even
though she is incapable of saying yes. As Justice Karakatsanis put it,
54. Supra note 3, concurred in by Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Martin
and Kasirer J.J. Justices Brown and Rowe wrote a concurring decision that
found that the reasons given by the trial judge were inadequate, but they
applied the curative proviso because of the abundance of evidence of nonconsent. See ibid., at para. 107. Justice Côté dissented, holding that capacity
is a vitiating factor that will only be considered if there is a reasonable doubt
about consent and that the reasons given were insufficient to support a
conviction. See ibid., at paras. 139, 146.
55. Ibid., at para. 24.
56. Ibid.
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the capacity to consent requires a higher level of understanding than the
capacity to withhold consent. As discussed, the capacity to consent is a
cumulative assessment, requiring the degree of understanding necessary
to appreciate all the conditions of subjective consent. If a complainant is
incapable of understanding any one of those conditions, then they are
incapable of consenting. Conversely, the capacity to withhold consent
inherently requires a lesser degree of understanding because that
capacity is established by a complainant’s capacity to understand any
of the necessary factors. For example, if a complainant is incapable of
understanding the sexual nature of proposed touching but knows they do
not want to be touched, then they are capable of withholding consent
despite being incapable of consenting.57

Courts have often looked to evidence of minimal physical or motor
capacity to indicate that a complainant has capacity to consent. In R.
v. Chen,58 for example, the fact that the complainant was able to
remember her cell phone password and was able to say that she did
not want her mother to be called was seen as evidence of capacity to
consent to sex.59 Where complainants have no memory of the sexual
assault, it can be particularly challenging for the Crown to prove
incapacity, because the complainant cannot counter the accused’s
evidence. In GF, the defence turned this around and argued that
because the complainant did remember the sexual assault, that was
evidence that she was in fact capable of consenting. Justice
Karakatsanis made clear that memory is not determinative as to
whether the complainant had capacity. Nor should evidence of
minimal motor skills necessarily rule out a finding of incapacity.
Whether the complainant has a memory of events or not does not answer
the incapacity question one way or another. The ultimate question of
capacity must remain rooted in the subjective nature of consent. The
question is not whether the complainant remembered the assault, retained
her motor skills, or was able to walk or talk. The question is whether the
complainant understood the sexual activity in question and that she could
refuse to participate.60

The test for capacity was not strictly speaking an issue in GF, but
nonetheless the court adopted the low threshold from the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. Al-Rawi:61
57. Ibid., at para. 62 [emphasis in original].
58. R. v. Chen (2016), 34 C.R. (7th) 352, 2016 CarswellAlta 2373, 2016 ABQB
644 (Alta. Q.B.).
59. See ibid., at paras 104-05.
60. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 65.
61. Supra note 2.
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In sum, for a complainant to be capable of providing subjective consent
to sexual activity, they must be capable of understanding four things:
1. the physical act;
2. that the act is sexual in nature;
3. the specific identity of the complainant’s partner or partners;
and
4. that they have the choice to refuse to participate in the sexual
activity.62

The inability to understand any of these components would negate
capacity and thus there could be no subjective consent.63 The fourth
of these components is worded in a manner that is inconsistent with
the understanding of non-consent in Ewanchuk. The focus should not
be on the complainant’s understanding of her right of refusal, since
legally she is not required to refuse. What matters is whether she
wants the sexual activity to take place. The final factor is really about
the capacity to make a decision about whether one wishes to engage in
the particular sexual act with the accused.
We have argued elsewhere that capacity should include the ability
to understand the risks and consequences of sexual activity.64 This is
not to suggest that capacity requires that a complainant actually
weigh those risks and consequences in any particular case, or that she
reach a particular conclusion about them, but rather that she have the
ability to do so if she chooses. How can one say that if the complainant
is unable to understand, for example, that unprotected vaginal
intercourse can lead to a pregnancy or an STI, that she is capable of
meaningfully saying yes to that activity? Capacity, as explained in GF,
does not offer the law’s protection to women who don’t understand
what they are saying yes to.
The analysis presented in GF allows no room to recognize that
different types of sexual activity are more risky and have more serious
potential consequences, and so it might take a higher level of capacity
for one to make a decision to participate in those activities. For
example, saying yes to unprotected intercourse may require a higher
level of capacity than saying yes to a kiss. In R. v. Barton,65 the
Supreme Court stated that, in the context of the reasonable steps
62. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 57.
63. Isabel Grant has argued elsewhere that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in
Al-Rawi, supra note 2 blurred the distinction between being capable of
making a decision from actually making it. See Grant, “Complex Legacy”,
supra note 4 at 73-74.
64. See generally Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet, “Capacity to Consent and
Intoxicated Complainants in Sexual Assault Prosecutions” (2017), 37 CR
(7th) 375 [Grant & Benedet, “Capacity to Consent”].
65. Supra note 23.
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provision that is part of the defence of mistaken belief in consent,
what steps are reasonable in the circumstances might be more
stringent where the activity carries greater risk.66 The same should
apply to incapacity. But in GF, the majority doubled down on an allor-nothing approach to capacity. A person is either fully capable of
saying yes to any sexual activity, however risky, or incapable of
saying yes to any sexual activity. This approach inevitably leads to the
search for the point at which the degree of intoxication or disability
(or both) puts the complainant over some fixed but elusive line of
incapacity, rather than recognizing capacity as a matter that is highly
context-dependent.
We agree with the majority that the linkage between incapacity and
non-consent is conceptually sound; it is incorrect to say that
incapacity vitiates an otherwise valid consent, as the dissent of
Justice Côté would have held. The complainant who is incapable of
consenting is just that – not able to formulate consent at all because of
her impaired mental state.
However, the majority blurred capacity and consent in its analysis
of the complainant’s ability to understand that she has a choice to
refuse to participate. Justice Karakatsanis stated that “a
complainant... who believes they have no choice in the matter, is
not capable of formulating subjective consent”.67 She made the same
point in her analysis of the facts:
As [the sexual activity] continued, the complainant struggled and told the
respondents to stop – evidence that she expressly refused to engage in the
sexual activity. When those struggles and demands were ignored by the
respondents, the complainant, in her confused and intoxicated state,
acquiesced, believing she had no choice in the matter – again, evidence
of incapacity.68

In our view, a complainant who is unable to understand that she has
a choice not to participate is incapable of giving consent, but a
complainant who concludes she has no choice but to participate is not
consenting. There may be a number of reasons why a complainant
might think she has no choice – for example, direct or indirect threats;
the fact that the accused is much bigger, stronger or older than her; or
the fact that the complainant has been sexually assaulted by the
accused in the past. In fact, a belief that one has no choice but to
submit is often a realistic assessment of the circumstances. Equating a
determination that one has no choice but to submit with incapacity
66. See ibid., at para. 108.
67. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 56.
68. Ibid., at para. 63.
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wrongly suggests that the complainant always does in fact have a
choice or can always say no. It also blurs non-consent as a state of
mind, which is what the offence is supposed to consider, with the old
common law definition of non-consent as a decision or choice that
needs to be expressed by words or action.
A complainant who submits because she believes she has no choice
is not consenting; she is acquiescing, just as the complainant testified
she did in the end in GF. Acquiescence or submission is not consent.69
It is possible that a complainant could be incapable and also believe
she has no choice but to submit, but these two findings need not
necessarily coexist.
We have argued elsewhere that the threshold for capacity to say yes
should be higher than the threshold for capacity to say no, and the GF
majority’s adoption of this position is an important development.70
This conclusion is particularly important because the case law
demonstrates that where the Crown asserts incapacity on the part of
the complainant, it is common for judges to disregard clear evidence
that the complainant actually told the accused to stop or
communicated her wish not to participate in some other way. In
GF, for example, the complainant testified that she said no
repeatedly. Where the trial judge believes such evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, that should be sufficient without the necessity of a
capacity inquiry. It is also common to see evidence of incapacity
significantly undermine the credibility of the complainant such that
her assertions of non-consent are disbelieved because the evidence of
her level of intoxication, needed to support the incapacity argument,
renders her testimony lacking in credibility or unreliable.71
It is important to recognize that capacity to consent, although
most commonly at issue in the context of a complainant who is
intoxicated, also arises in the context of a complainant who has a
disability that might affect her capacity to consent to sexual
activity.72 The capacity test developed in GF is clearly focused on
69. See Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 356.
70. See Grant & Benedet, “Capacity to Consent”, supra note 64 at 377.
71. See e.g. R v. Kishayinew (2019), 382 C.C.C. (3d) 560, 60 C.R. (7th) 51, 451
D.L.R. (4th) 430 (Sask. C.A.), reversed (2020), 396 C.C.C. (3d) 417, 67 C.R.
(7th) 1, 451 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. L. (T.W.), 2017
CarswellNWT 23, 2017 NWTSC 19, 138 W.C.B. (2d) 410 (N.W.T. S.C.)
(where the trial judge found the complainant “to be a credible but utterly
unreliable witness. Her level of intoxication was such that I am unable to
make any firm conclusions based on her recollection of events” at para. 13).
72. See generally Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault
Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural
Issues” (2007), 52 McGill LJ 515; Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “A
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intoxicated complainants. We wonder how useful this capacity test is
for complainants with intellectual or other disabilities that might
impair the ability to consent. For example, is it likely that a woman
with an intellectual disability targeted by the driver of her accessible
bus service will be incapable of understanding who her sexual partner
is? What does it mean to say that she needs to understand that the
activity in question is sexual? What does she need to understand
about the sexual nature of the activity? Does she have to understand
the role of sex in reproduction? What about in the transmission of
STIs? Presumably not, given the rejection of “risks and
consequences” in the capacity analysis. But then what makes
activity “sexual” if that understanding is completely divorced from
its risks? The conflation of incapacity with a belief that one cannot
refuse is also problematic for this group of complainants. If a
complainant with an intellectual disability believes she has no choice
but to comply with a demand for sex – because otherwise she will lose
access to her accessible bus service which may be her only access to the
community – she does not want the sexual activity to take place as
required by Ewanchuk. She simply believes she has no other choice,
which is not necessarily evidence of incapacity but rather of nonconsent.
Canadian courts have so far shown little interest in recognizing the
differences in the contexts in which incapacity arises. Courts have
mostly treated incapacity as an all-or-nothing line which, when
crossed, means that a complainant can consent to nothing in any
circumstances. Courts have focused on the abilities of the
complainant in the moment and not on the circumstances in which
she finds herself; she is either capable of consenting to even the riskiest
sexual activity in the most dangerous circumstances or incapable of
consenting to anything, even to a kiss by a boyfriend.
Allowing a trier of fact to examine non-consent before determining
capacity is particularly important for women and girls with
intellectual disabilities because of the serious impact of a finding of
incapacity. People with intellectual disabilities have long had their
sexuality controlled and limited by the state and caregivers.73 The law
needs to evolve in a way that recognizes that adults with intellectual
disabilities are fully sexual human beings, while also protecting them
from the disproportionate rates of sexual violence and exploitation to
Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental Disability in Sexual Assault
Law” (2013), 43:1 Ottawa L Rev 1 [Benedet & Grant, “A Situational
Approach”].
73. See e.g. Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief”, supra
note 51 at 251, 289.
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which they are subjected. As complainants in sexual assault
prosecutions, they may endure intense scrutiny of their abilities and
understanding of sex at trial in order to establish whether they are
capable of giving consent.74 The Crown is often put in a position of
undermining the credibility and reliability of its own main witness by
leading evidence of her incapacity. Defence counsel are quick to jump
on this opportunity to undermine the credibility of the complainant.
Findings of incapacity are more drastic for women and girls with
intellectual disabilities than for intoxicated complainants precisely
because intoxication is transient and a finding about capacity in one
moment does not impact capacity in other moments. Such is not the
case for most complainants with intellectual disabilities. While we
have argued elsewhere that incapacity for complainants with
intellectual disabilities should be viewed situationally,75 most cases
still treat it as an all-or-nothing status. Thus, the conclusion that nonconsent can be addressed first is particularly important for this group
of complainants.
Until courts recognize the need for a situational approach to
incapacity, the clarification in GF that a court may consider capacity
and non-consent in any order – and can make a finding of nonconsent even where the complainant may have been incapable of
consenting – gives Crown counsel and judges the flexibility to avoid
capacity inquiries where there is evidence that the complainant did
not want the sexual activity to take place. It also prevents these
complainants from being exposed to extensive and potentially
humiliating direct and cross-examination at trial about their
understanding of sex, hygiene and other intimate matters. 76
Capacity inquiries can also subject women with disabilities to
invasive cross-examination about their past sexual history in an
attempt to demonstrate that they have had capacity in the past, even if
that past sexual activity was itself exploitative, which is a reflection of
the failure to recognize that capacity is highly context-dependent.
Thinking about capacity beyond intoxication also requires
consideration of how the age of the complainant should operate
74. See e.g. R. v. Slatter (2020), 396 C.C.C. (3d) 415, 67 C.R. (7th) 5, 452 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [Slatter SCC], reversing (2019), 382 C.C.C. (3d) 245, 58 C.R.
(7th) 18, 452 D.L.R. (4th) 4 (Ont. C.A.) [Slatter ONCA]; R. v. Prince (2008),
232 Man. R. (2d) 281, 2008 CarswellMan 479, 2008 MBQB 241 (Man. Q.B.);
R. v. D. (N.J.) (1990), 281 A.P.R. 271, 112 N.B.R. (2d) 271, 1990
CarswellNB 206 (N.B. C.A.).
75. See generally Benedet & Grant, “A Situational Approach”, supra note 72.
See also Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief”, supra
note 51 at 269-70.
76. See Benedet & Grant, “A Situational Approach”, supra note 72 at 12.
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within this framework. In our view, courts should approach age as
going to capacity. A child who is under the age of consent is incapable
of consenting to an adult who is not within the close in age exceptions.
Age is not one more vitiating factor that negates an otherwise valid
consent; age is a prerequisite to consent. Relying on GF, this does not
mean that an underage child cannot withhold consent: a child may
know that she does not want to be touched sexually by the accused
without being capable of consenting to sex with someone who is
considerably older than her.
For many years, courts tended to treat cases involving adolescent
complainants who are below the age of consent, and who allege sexual
assault by adult men, as technical “statutory rapes” that are less
serious than real sexual assaults. Only in recent years have courts
rejected the language of de facto consent and recognized that the
damage to children and teenagers from sexual activity with adults is
no less profound than the harm done to adult victims. As the Alberta
Court of Appeal acknowledged in a sentencing case, R. v. Hajar,77
using “de facto consent” as a mitigating factor would fail to recognize
that children under 16 are simply incapable of consenting to sex with
adults:
In raising the age of consent, Parliament determined that children in the
protected category are incapable of consenting to sexual activity with
older persons outside the close in age exceptions. That is because of the
power imbalance inherent in the relationships between children and
those older persons coupled with the particular vulnerability of children.
Put simply, children in the protected category are not capable of
making such an important, personal and potentially life-altering
decision.78

The suggestion that children can give subjective consent to adults
who are often decades older than them will only undermine efforts to
take child sexual abuse seriously and lead to a possible backsliding
into seeing these crimes as mere “statutory” rapes. Age must be
viewed as an essential component of capacity.

(ii) Consent
While GF clarified the relationship between capacity and consent
in a helpful way, albeit with a low threshold for capacity and a
blurring of non-consent and incapacity, the judgment is more
problematic on consent. Particularly concerning are the majority’s
77. R. v. Hajar (2016), 338 C.C.C. (3d) 477, 31 C.R. (7th) 1, [2016] 12 W.W.R.
435 (Alta. C.A.).
78. Ibid., at para. 88 [emphasis added].
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efforts to justify the deeply flawed logic from R. v. Hutchinson79 in
interpreting how consent interacts with factors that preclude or
vitiate it, such as those listed in ss. 273.1(2) and 265(3). Hutchinson
had suggested that all the factors in those sections were vitiating
factors – i.e., factors that would negate an otherwise valid consent.
The Court of Appeal and the dissent in GF agreed.
The majority in GF rightly took capacity out of the list of vitiating
factors and made it a precondition to consent, not a vitiating factor. It
was unnecessary for the court to go any further by looking at factors
other than capacity, which were not at issue. In choosing to do so
anyway, the court gave too much weight to the vitiation stage of
consent, which has a number of consequences. First, the focus on
vitiation undermines the requirement in s. 273.1(1) that consent
means the voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question.
Second, and connected to the first, GF demonstrates a subtle shift
away from Ewanchuk and the requirement that “[f]or the purposes of
the actus reus, ‘consent’ means that the complainant in her mind
wanted the sexual touching to take place.”80 Finally, the majority
over-complicated the doctrine of fraud, adding a new requirement
without clarifying where it fits into the existing framework. None of
this was necessary on the facts of GF.

(A) Vitiation and Voluntariness
In GF, the majority held that there are two components to the
concept of “subjective consent”. The first inquiry is whether the
complainant subjectively and voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity
in question, and the second inquiry is whether that subjective consent
should be legally invalidated – or vitiated – for public policy
reasons.81 By placing too many situations in the vitiation category,
the court has effectively weakened what it means to say consent must
be voluntary. In other words, by separating out the subjective consent
inquiry from most of the statutory factors that negate subjective
consent, the majority has left very little content to the concept of
voluntary agreement and instead held that the effective limits on
consent are based on policy, not the definition of consent itself. This
can be demonstrated through the court’s analysis of ss. 265(3) and
273.1(2).
First, we are told that all of the factors listed s. 265(3) vitiate an
otherwise valid consent, and then the court added that the elements
79. Supra note 7.
80. Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 355.
81. See GF SCC, supra note 3 at paras. 31-33.
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set out in s. 273.1(2) operate in different ways, some precluding
consent, others vitiating it:
Section 265(3) sets out four factors that will vitiate subjective consent to
sexual activity. Subjective consent will not be given legal effect where it is
the product of force, threats or fear of force, certain types of fraud, or the
exercise of authority: s. 265(3)(a) to (d). Section 273.1(2)(c) also vitiates
subjective consent where the complainant is induced into sexual activity by
the accused abusing a position of trust, power, or authority. . . .When
subjective consent is the product of these factors, the complainant has been
deprived of control over who touches their body, and how, and there is no
consent in law. . .
However, these factors do not prevent subjective consent. Rather, they
recognize that even if the complainant has permitted the sexual activity
in question, there are circumstances in which that subjective consent will
be vitiated – deemed of no force or effect. The distinction between
preventing subjective consent and rendering it ineffective may be subtle,
but it is important. A factor that prevents subjective consent must
logically be linked to what subjective consent requires. Conversely, a
factor that vitiates subjective consent is not tethered to the conditions of
subjective consent and must find footing and justification in broader
policy considerations. 82

Thus, the Court described s. 273.1(2) as multifaceted with its
primary function being to clarify the broad definition of consent in s.
273.1(1). Only s. 273.1(2)(c), dealing with the abuse of trust, power or
authority, vitiates consent as a matter of public policy.83
On first blush, this may not seem problematic – why does it matter
whether consent was never there or is vitiated after the fact, so long as
the outcome is the same? The problem is evident when we think about
how these factors operate in practice. Section 265(3)(a) provides that
no consent is obtained where the submission or lack of resistance is
caused by force to the complainant or to some other person.84 Section
265(3)(b) provides that no consent is obtained where lack of
resistance is based on “threats or fear of the application of force to
the complainant or to a person other than the complainant”.85 The
majority in GF said that both of these are vitiating factors. What that
means is that when a complainant submits to sexual activity because
of the application of force or the threat of force, she is “voluntarily
agreeing to the sexual activity in question” and we are just vitiating
her consent after the fact as a matter of policy. This undoes decades of
82.
83.
84.
85.

Ibid., at paras. 35-36 [emphasis in original; citations omitted].
Ibid., at para. 44 [citations omitted].
See Criminal Code, supra note 11, s. 265(3)(a).
Ibid., s. 265(3)(b).
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law reform and judicial decisions designed to eliminate the resistance
requirement and to give consent real content, and simply must be
wrong. A complainant who goes along with sexual activity to save
herself or her child is not giving subjective consent. If the Supreme
Court is correct, consent has been reduced to bare agreement or
acquiescence. Central to the decision in Ewanchuk was that consent
“means that the complainant in her mind wanted the sexual touching
to take place.”86 A woman who submits because of threats or fear
does not in her mind want the sexual activity to take place. She has not
given consent in her own mind. She has submitted to sexual activity
because she is afraid of what the accused might do to her. By calling
this factor vitiating, we are saying that submission out of fear is
voluntary agreement, thus reducing voluntary agreement to a bare
“ok, but only to protect my life or safety.”
Justice Karakatsanis also decided that consent that is induced by
an abuse of trust, power or authority meets the test of subjective
consent that is then vitiated for public policy reasons. If the
complainant has agreed to sexual activity because of the abuse of
trust, power or authority, that agreement may well not be voluntary
but rather induced through the exploitative behaviour on the part of
the accused. Justice Hoegg, in her concurring minority at the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal in R. v. Snelgrove,87 made this point
clearly:
As well, I am concerned about the use of the phrase “vitiation of
consent” to describe the possible effect of section 273.1(2)(c). I would
not describe section 273.1(2)(c) as providing for the vitiation of consent
section 273.1(2)(c) provides that there is no consent to sexual activity if
it has been induced by an accused’s abuse of a position of trust, power or
authority. In other words, it is not a question of vitiating or nullifying
consent, because there was no consent at law in the first place. 88

The reason that there was no consent in the first place was because
the agreement to participate was not truly voluntary.
Consent is the voluntary agreement to participate in the sexual
activity in question. The Supreme Court of Canada has given very
little attention to what the voluntariness requirement adds to s. 273.1,
but it did uphold, from the bench, reasons from the Court of Appeal
for Ontario which gave broad scope to the voluntariness
requirement. In R. v. Stender,89 the complainant had gone to the
86. Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 355.
87. R. v. Snelgrove (2018), 366 C.C.C. (3d) 164, 50 C.R. (7th) 133, 437 D.L.R.
(4th) 484 (N.L. C.A.), affirmed [2019] 2 S.C.R. 98, 53 C.R. (7th) 45, 437
D.L.R. (4th) 480 (S.C.C.) [Snelgrove SCC].
88. Ibid., at para. 52.
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accused’s house to retrieve nude photographs of her he was keeping
on his computer. She agreed to have sex with the accused only because
he threatened to disseminate those photographs of her to her family
and her employer if she refused.90 The Court of Appeal held that there
was no need to consider whether consent was vitiated by an abuse of
trust because there was no voluntary agreement in the first place.
M.O. advanced a version of events in which she vehemently denied that
she freely consented to the sexual acts in question. Throughout her
testimony, she repeatedly stated her belief that she had no choice but to
submit to intercourse with the respondent; that her purpose in going to
the respondent’s apartment (on both occasions) was to secure the
deletion of the respondent’s computer files containing the nude
photographs so as to avoid their dissemination and the reputational
injury that would follow; that she told the respondent during both
attendances at his apartment that she did not want to have sex with him;
that the respondent knew that she “fought him off”; and that he pressured
her to engage in sex as a condition for the deletion of the computer files.
On M.O.’s evidence, therefore, she did not wish the sexual touching to
occur, and no actual consent to the touching was ever given.91

One of the clearest articulations of the role of voluntariness can be
found in the Quebec Court of Appeal decision in St. Laurent, which
was cited at length by the Court of Appeal in DS:
As a matter both of language and of law, consent implies a reasonably
informed choice, freely exercised. No such choice has been exercised
where a person engages in sexual activity as a result of fraud, force, fear,
or violence. Nor is the consent requirement satisfied if, because of his or
her mental state, one of the parties is incapable of understanding the
sexual nature of the act, or of realizing that he or she may choose to
decline participation.
“Consent” is, thus, stripped of its defining characteristics when it is
applied to the submission, non-resistance, non-objection, or even the
apparent agreement, of a deceived, unconscious or compelled will. 92
89. R. v. Stender (2004), 188 C.C.C. (3d) 514, 24 C.R. (6th) 91, (sub nom. R. v. S.
(D.G.)) 72 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.) [DS cited to OJ], affirmed [2005] 1
S.C.R. 914, 201 C.C.C. (3d) 319, 258 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.) [Stender].
90. See DS, ibid., at para. 27.
91. Ibid., at para 49.
92. Ibid., at para. 50 [emphasis in original], quoting St-Laurent c. Que´bec (Juge
de la Cour du Que´bec) (1993), (sub nom. R. v. Saint-Laurent) 90 C.C.C. (3d)
291, (sub nom. St. Laurent c. Hétu) [1994] R.J.Q. 69, 1993 CarswellQue 990
(C.A. Que.) at 311, leave to appeal refused (1994), (sub nom. Saint-Laurent v.
Hétu (Juge)) 175 N.R. 240 (note), (sub nom. Saint-Laurent c. Hétu (Juge)) 66
Q.A.C. 160 (note), [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 55 (S.C.C.).
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Someone who is coerced into agreeing to participate in sexual
activity because she is afraid of being harmed in some way is not
voluntarily agreeing to the sexual activity. Subsections 265(3)(a) and
(b) were wrongly characterized as vitiating consent by the majority in
GF. Characterizing s. 273.1(2)(c) (dealing with abuses of trust, power
or authority) as always vitiating is also problematic. Where a
complainant wanted the sexual activity to take place, vitiation may
have a role to play. However, a complainant who submits to sexual
activity with someone who is abusing a position of trust, power or
authority may well not have voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity
in question but rather may have acquiesced based on that abuse by the
accused. It is important that courts not jump straight to vitiation
without examining whether in fact the complainant wanted the sexual
activity to take place. A robust definition of voluntariness should
reduce the reliance on this provision and focus courts’ attention on
subjective consent. A complainant who submits because of an abuse
of trust, power or authority – even if she does not appreciate the
influence being exerted on her at the time – does not voluntarily agree.
It was entirely unnecessary to conclude that all abuses of trust, power
or authority are vitiating in a case that did not raise this issue.
Limiting the reliance on vitiation is important for situations that are
not included expressly in the Criminal Code. If voluntariness is not
given any real role to play in the definition of consent, courts may be
unwilling to give it content in other contexts not covered explicitly by
ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2).
The vitiation approach also has potential implications for
sentencing. A finding of vitiated consent includes by definition the
conclusion that the complainant has given subjective consent. We
worry that this finding could be used to argue that these sexual
assaults are somehow less serious than others where the complainant
did not give subjective consent, thus creating a hierarchy of sexual
assaults. Consider a case where “the accused induces the complainant
to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or
authority” under s. 273.1(2). For example, a complainant may engage
in sexual activity with her therapist because she is afraid of losing
access to his therapeutic care.93 The Supreme Court in GF said that
subjective consent in this situation is present, but it is vitiated for
public policy reasons. One can also imagine defence counsel trying to
argue at sentencing that the presence of subjective consent makes the
sexual assault less serious. If the courts are increasingly relying on the
concept of vitiation, they need to make a strong statement that there is
93. See e.g. R. v. Kilian, 2018 CarswellAlta 868, 2018 ABQB 273, 147 W.C.B.
(2d) 543 (Alta. Q.B.) at paras. 95-99.
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no hierarchy based on whether consent is vitiated or never present at
all.

(B) Is Agreeing to Sex the Same Thing as Wanting it to
Take Place?
This evisceration of the voluntariness requirement is closely
connected to another subtle change in the law that we saw in GF. One
of the landmark aspects of Ewanchuk was the requirement that “[f]or
the purposes of the actus reus, ‘consent’ means that the complainant
in her mind wanted the sexual touching to take place.”94 The majority
does not explicitly define the actus reus this way. It does acknowledge
that a complainant may be incapable and still know that she does not
want to be touched, but Justice Karakatsanis repeatedly refers to the
complainant agreeingto the sexual activity rather than wanting it to
take place.
It is difficult to know what this shift is intended to signal, but we
note that there may well be circumstances where a complainant
agrees to participate in sex but does not want the sexual activity in
question to take place. Threats of harm, as discussed above, provide a
clear example of this distinction. There are numerous reasons why a
complainant submits to sexual activity that she does not want to
happen: the victim of domestic assault who wants to calm down her
partner so that he will stop hurting her; the drug user who wants
access to her supply that the accused controls; or the low-wage worker
concerned for her continued employment if she does not go along
with her employer’s advances. The voluntariness requirement helps
clarify the line between consent and submission. Consent requires a
complainant who wants the sexual activity to take place. If you take
all substance out of the requirement for voluntary agreement,
agreement comes dangerously close to compliance or submission,
which Ewanchuk established was not equivalent to consent. This is
particularly true for complainants who face a significant imbalance in
power vis-à-vis their sexual partner.
A recent decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario applies the
approach we have suggested, giving meaning to the voluntariness
required for consent. The complainant in R. v. P.D.C.,95 who had
been an intimate relationship with the appellant, testified that she did
not want to have sex with the appellant but that she had no choice
because if she didn’t submit “(t)here would have been more fighting,
94. Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 355.
95. R. v. P.D.C. (2021), 401 C.C.C. (3d) 406, 2021 CarswellOnt 2831, 2021
ONCA 134 (Ont. C.A.) [PDC].
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more–I’d be a prisoner, [and] wouldn’t be allowed to go home.”96 The
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge should
have first looked to subjective consent and only then considered
whether her agreement was vitiated under s. 265(3) or s. 273.1(2).
Relying on Ewanchuk and Stender,97 the court held that where
agreement to participate is not voluntary, there is no need to get to s.
265(3):
Where a person does not actually choose to participate in the sexual
activity, there is no voluntary agreement. The absence of this subjective
mental state – voluntary agreement to participate in sexual activity –
establishes the requisite actus reus of the offence, and makes it
unnecessary to enter into an inquiry as to whether ss. 265(3) or 273.1(2)
applies to vitiate that consent.98

Not only does this approach maintain a significant role for
voluntary agreement, it also confirms that believing you have no
choice but to submit goes directly to proof of non-consent. While
PDC was decided after GF, the court did not cite GF in this part of its
judgment.

(C) Three Levels of Fraud
GF also attempted to clarify the doctrine of fraud, even though no
issue of fraud was raised in the case. Instead, the Court has muddied
the waters by over complicating fraud and not being clear about what
GF adds or takes away from previous case law. The majority
described three levels of fraud.99 First, fraud relating to any of the
elements of subjective consent negates that consent. For these cases,
there is no requirement that the Crown prove a significant risk of
serious bodily harm – the fraud instead goes directly to the
definitional elements of consent. Fraud relating to the identity of a
sexual partner or the sexual nature of the activity will negate consent
in all circumstances. For example, a woman who agrees to have sex
with someone she believes to be her husband when he is in fact the
husband’s identical twin brother impersonating the husband, is not
consenting.
Second, fraud that goes to aspects of the sexual activity other than
the elements of subjective consent, does not directly negate consent
but rather vitiates it under s. 265(3). The Crown is held to a higher
standard when demonstrating this second kind of fraud vitiating
96.
97.
98.
99.

Ibid., at para. 11.
Supra note 89.
PDC, supra note 95 at para. 77 [citations omitted].
See GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 37.
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consent and must also prove that the deception had the
“reprehensible character of criminal acts.”100
Third, fraud that is neither linked to the conditions of subjective
consent nor has the “reprehensible character of criminal acts” is
irrelevant to consent. Thus, for example, a deception about marital
status or wealth is presumably in this third category.101
It is the second category of fraud that has caused so much difficulty
for the courts. The law has evolved primarily in the context of persons
who fail to disclose their HIV-positive status to their sexual partners.
However, in Hutchinson, the HIV case law crossed into the consent
case law. After Hutchinson, a woman who believes she is only
consenting to sex if a condom is used is told otherwise by the courts.
The GF majority indicated that the Crown must prove the
“reprehensible character of criminal acts” for the second level of
fraud. This phrase originated in R. v. Cuerrier102 and was resurrected
by the slim majority in Hutchinson.103 It is completely absent from
other HIV nondisclosure cases, including the Supreme Court’s own
leading post-Cuerrier decision in R. v. Mabior.104 The GF majority
makes no mention of the very significant limit the court has
consistently put on fraud in s. 265(3)(c) since Cuerrier. Such fraud
is only criminalized where it creates a significant risk of serious bodily
harm. There is no mention of this requirement in GF, and so it is not
clear if the “reprehensible character” test is another way of expressing
this requirement. Whether the majority was simply reflecting on
fraud in a context that did not raise fraud and felt there was no need to
discuss this limitation, or whether it was intending to revise the fraud
framework, is unclear. In the context of HIV nondisclosure
prosecutions, the limit serves an important public policy function.
100. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 39, citing Cuerrier, supra note 6 at para. 133.
101. There is a tendency to trivialize the harm to women’s autonomy caused by
these other deceptions that are outside the scope of criminal law and to
catastrophize the overcriminalization that could result should such deceptions be recognized in law. For example, in Cuerrier, supra note 6 at para.
403, then Justice McLachlin stated in the context of criminalizing deceptions:
“Will alluring make-up or a false moustache suffice to render the casual
social act criminal?”. The same tendency was evident in the hearing of
Kirkpatrick at the Supreme Court of Canada where Justice Rowe used the
example of deceptions about eye colour. See R. v. Kirkpatrick (2020), 388
C.C.C. (3d) 60, 63 C.R. (7th) 338, 2020 CarswellBC 1201 (B.C. C.A.), leave
to appeal allowed Ross McKenzie Kirkpatrick v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2021
CarswellBC 189, 2021 CarswellBC 190 (S.C.C.) [Kirkpatrick SCC] (Oral
argument).
102. Supra note 6.
103. See Hutchinson, supra note 7 at para. 42.
104. Supra note 26.
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The court should not be taken as removing this requirement for the
HIV context in a case that had nothing to do with HIV nondisclosure
or fraud.
However, that same limitation of a significant risk of serious
bodily harm that has reduced the criminalization of people with HIV
has caused problems for sexual assault prosecutions outside of the
HIV nondisclosure context.105 Hutchinson, and a number of cases
involving nonconsensual condom removal, provide an example of
this problem. Because Hutchinson defined the essential features of
the “sexual activity in question” so as to exclude whether a condom
was used from the definition of consent, nonconsensual condom
removal is treated as a form of fraud that only vitiates consent,
falling under s. 265(3)(c) in the second of the GF court’s three
categories. In Hutchinson, the risk of bodily harm was an unwanted
pregnancy, which actually materialized in that case. But not
everyone faces a significant risk of serious bodily harm from the
removal of a condom. Unless one’s sexual partner has an STI,
deceptive or nonconsensual condom removal does not create a risk
of serious bodily harm for complainants who are already pregnant or
unable to become pregnant. Thus, the criminal law fails to
acknowledge the choice about condom use, for example, in regard
to men having sex with men, pregnant women, older women and
others so long as there is no STI involved. Nor does the doctrine of
fraud apply where there has been no deception by the accused and
instead, he simply proceeds with sexual activity without a condom
despite the wishes of his partner.106
It is surprising that the GF majority thought it was a good idea to go
into fraud in this much detail in a case that had nothing to do with
fraud, especially given that the court, even at the time GF was
released, had a case before it that squarely raises nonconsensual
condom refusal and fraud. In R. v. Kirkpatrick,107 the court has been
asked to reconsider its decision in Hutchinson that agreement to sex
with a condom necessarily includes agreement to sex without a
condom. The complainant in Kirkpatrick made clear to the accused
that she would only participate in sex with a condom. The accused
ignored that request and proceeded with intercourse without a
105. It has also led to widespread calls to remove HIV nondisclosure from sexual
assault. See e.g. Grant, “Complex Legacy”, supra note 4 at 71-72; Women’s
Legal Education and Action Fund, “A Feminist Approach to Law Reform
on HIV Non-Disclosure” (2019), online: 5www.leaf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-08-LEAF-HIV-ND-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf4.
106. See further Gotell & Grant, supra note 4.
107. Kirkpatrick SCC, supra note 101.

2022]

Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault

107

condom. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia was divided on
whether he had pretended to use a condom (in which case fraud might
apply), or whether he had just ignored her expressed wishes. The
majority in the Court of Appeal differentiated Hutchinson on the
basis that condom refusal (Kirkpatrick) is different than condom
deception (Hutchinson). Excluding condom refusal from the
definition of consent “would leave the law of Canada seriously out
of touch with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of
sexual autonomy.”108 The confusion created by Hutchinson could be
remedied through the simple recognition that sex with a condom is a
different sexual activity than sex without. This is common sense to
most Canadians and clearly troubled the majority of the Court of
Appeal for British Columbia.109 It is encouraging that the majority in
GF began its judgment by quoting from Ewanchuk that “control over
who touches one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity
and autonomy”110 The majority in Hutchinson had removed the
crucial “and how” part of this important statement from Ewanchuk.
Its recognition in GF opens the door for the Kirkpatrick Court to
rethink this flawed approach of a narrow four-judge majority in
Hutchinson.

(iii) Appellate Review
The other important aspect of the decision in GF is the court’s
analysis of the proper scope of appellate review. The accused in GF
were convicted at trial, and the convictions were overturned by a
divided Ontario Court of Appeal, leading to an appeal as of right to
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court allowed the
appeal and restored the convictions. In the months prior to GF, the
Supreme Court did the same thing in a number of other sexual offence
cases, most of which reached the court as Crown appeals as of right,
and all of which resulted in trial convictions being restored.111
108. R. v. Kirkpatrick (2020), 388 C.C.C. (3d) 60, 63 C.R. (7th) 338, 2020
CarswellBC 1201 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 3, leave to appeal allowed Ross
McKenzie Kirkpatrick v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2021 CarswellBC 189, 2021
CarswellBC 190 (S.C.C.).
109. Lower courts appear to also have been troubled by the fraud framework in
Hutchinson, supra note 7, or have ignored it altogether. See e.g. R. v. Rivera,
2019 CarswellOnt 10331, 2019 ONSC 3918, 157 W.C.B. (2d) 220 (Ont.
S.C.J.); R. v. Lupi, 2019 CarswellOnt 10334, 2019 ONSC 3713, 157 W.C.B.
(2d) 3 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. S.Y., 2017 CarswellOnt 18320, 2017 ONCJ 798, 143
W.C.B. (2d) 423 (Ont. C.J.). See also Gotell & Grant, supra note 4 at 25-28
(for a discussion of these cases).
110. Ewanchuk, supra note 5 at 348, cited in GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 1
[emphasis added].
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In GF, the majority took the unusual step of rebuking appellate
courts for being too willing to overturn valid convictions in the sexual
assault context, based on grounds of appeal such as inadequacy of
reasons, uneven scrutiny, or errors in the assessment of credibility:
Despite this Court’s clear guidance in the 19 years since Sheppard to
review reasons functionally and contextually, we continue to encounter
appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a
search for error, particularly in sexual assault cases, where safe
convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of
legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression
on the part of the trial judge. Frequently, it is the findings of credibility
that are challenged.112

Justices Brown and Rowe, concurring, agreed with the majority’s
treatment of capacity and consent, but expressed concern with the
part of the majority reasons dealing with appellate review, a position
shared by Côté J. in her dissenting reasons. They disagreed that where
reasons are ambiguous, judges should be presumed to know the law,
and took issue with the concern about over-scrutiny:
Of course, safe convictions free from legal error should not be
overturned. But, and with respect, this is an unhelpful observation,
since it is not possible to conclude that convictions are “safe” or that
trials were “fair” where the reasons are insufficient to permit appellate
review. Our colleague’s critique assumes the conclusion. While a trial
judge’s reasons need not be letter-perfect, we do not consider scrutiny of
a trial judge’s reasons to be inconsistent with this Court’s guidance in
Sheppard. To the contrary, appellate courts are tasked with reviewing a
trial judge’s reasons on appeal, and an appellant from a conviction has a
statutorily granted right to have the trial verdict “properly scrutinized”
(Sheppard, at para. 46 (emphasis in original)).113

Of course, in a basic sense, both of these positions have merit. An
appellate court should not require an entire criminal trial to be redone merely because a trial judge has failed to make reference to some
piece of evidence or has not spelled out in ponderous detail the
components of legal tests that are well-known to all and not in
dispute. An appellate court should, however, provide an opportunity
for a meaningful second look at criminal verdicts that could result in
the loss of individual liberty and a criminal record. The trial record
111. See e.g. Slatter SCC, supra note 74; R. v. C.P. (2021), 404 C.C.C. (3d) 217, 71
C.R. (7th) 118, 457 D.L.R. (4th) 553 (S.C.C.); Snelgrove SCC, supra note 87;
R. v. Smith (2021), 405 C.C.C. (3d) 413, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 549, 2021
CarswellBC 1278 (S.C.C.).
112. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 76.
113. Ibid., at para. 110.
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must be capable of facilitating that review. These propositions are so
basic and uncontroversial that they hardly merit mention by the
Supreme Court.
In fact, the problem in the sexual assault context is that appeals
from considered verdicts of conviction have become routine and the
grounds of appeal raised are often rote. It is unusual to see an appeal
from conviction for non-sexual offences on the grounds of
inadequate reasons, or a failure to properly apply reasonable doubt
to credibility, but these grounds are the bread and butter of
conviction appeals in the sexual assault context.
In most sexual assault cases, the complainant testifies to a series of
events that clearly meet the definition of sexual assault, and the
defence attacks the credibility of the complainant. If she is an adult,
the defence argues that she consented and so is bringing a false
complaint of sexual assault, and if she is a child, the defence argues
that no sexual activity ever took place, and so the child has made a
false complaint of sexual abuse. Sometimes the complainant is
attacked indirectly as being unreliable rather than directly as a liar.
Very rarely does the accused have another argument – that he
mistakenly believed the complainant was consenting after having
taken reasonable steps to ensure that she was, or that the complainant
was sexually assaulted by someone else, but he has been misidentified
as the perpetrator. While the accused is not required to offer an
explanation as to why the complainant would lie, the explanations
suggested by the defence are predictable as well, if slightly more
varied: the complainant wanted to cover up the fact she was having
sex with someone else;114 the complainant wanted to impress her
friend;115 the complainant had a financial motive;116 the complainant
wanted to punish the accused for rejecting her;117 the complainant
was influenced by the sexual assault centre where she was now
working.118 All of these explanations continue to resonate with some
judges and jurors because they are rooted in deeply held sexist myths
and stereotypes.
114. See e.g. R. v. R.V. (2019), 378 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 55 C.R. (7th) 297, 436 D.L.R.
(4th) 265 (S.C.C.) at para. 54.
115. See e.g. Slatter ONCA, supra note 74 at para. 32.
116. See e.g. R. v. Grabinski (1997), 209 A.R. 163, 160 W.A.C. 163, 1997
CarswellAlta 849 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 11.
117. See e.g. R. v. Zou (2017), 346 C.C.C. (3d) 490, 2017 ONCA 90, 2017
CarswellOnt 1157 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 28.
118. See e.g. R. v. Sivasubramanian, 2021 ONCA 61, 2021 CarswellOnt 1026, 169
W.C.B. (2d) 494 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 7; R. v. Smith (2020), 393 C.C.C. (3d)
581, 2020 BCCA 271, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 553 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 12, reversed
(2021), 405 C.C.C. (3d) 413, 2021 SCC 16, 456 D.L.R. (4th) 549 (S.C.C.).
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Sexual assault trials are, for the most part, not that complicated.
Those who justify the disproportionate acquittals rates in sexual
assault trials as compared to other offences point to the effect of the
“he said, she said” dynamic of many sexual assault cases as an
explanation, in light of the presumption of innocence. (In fact, many
sexual assault trials are just “she said” cases, with the accused
deciding not to take the stand.) If this is true, then there is little reason
for error on the part of the trial judge. These cases engage very little
substantive sexual assault law and are basic credibility exercises,
within the framework of the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So long as judges
do not make the mistake of thinking their task is merely choosing
whom to believe, and the rules of evidence are respected, the task is
straightforward. As the majority in GF stated:
The respondents received a fair trial. They were presumed innocent and
held the Crown to its burden to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. They thoroughly cross-examined the complainant and mounted a
multi-faceted defence against the charge. But fairness does not require
perfection: R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, at para. 45, per McLachlin
J. The trial judge accepted the evidence of the complainant that sexual
activity began when she was unconscious and continued despite her
pleas for the respondents to stop. His reasons revealed no error on a
proper appellate reading. The respondents’ convictions should not have
been overturned simply because the trial judge expressed himself
poorly.119

Reading the court of appeal decisions in many of the cases that
were overturned leaves one with the impression that courts still
believe that wrongful convictions in the sexual assault context,
produced by lying complainants, are a particular and pervasive
threat.120
The result is that the complainant who manages to get the police to
take her report of sexual assault seriously and to investigate it
thoroughly, to convince the Crown that she is not so damaged or
lacking in credibility that the case should proceed to trial, and to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that she was
sexually assaulted by the accused, finds her attacker’s conviction
overturned on appeal for the flimsiest of reasons,121 requiring that the
119. GF SCC, supra note 3 at para. 91.
120. There has also been some backlash to the majority’s comments in subsequent
academic commentary. See e.g. Palma Paciocco, “Presumptions, Assumptions, and Reasons for Reasons: The Sufficiency of Trial Judgments After R
v GF” (2021), 71 CR (7th) 54.
121. See e.g. R. v. Kruk, 2022 BCCA 18, 2022 CarswellBC 102 (B.C. C.A.).
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whole ordeal start over again from the beginning. We believe that the
cautions in the GF majority are sound, and long overdue.

5. Conclusion
We suggest that the Criminal Code would benefit from a unified set
of provisions on consent and non-consent that brings together the
1983 and 1992 revisions into a coherent whole. Those revisions
should retain the definition of consent as voluntary agreement, and
add a definition of non-consent as meaning that the complainant did
not, in her own mind, want the sexual activity to take place, codifying
the definition in Ewanchuk. The Code could then specify, for greater
certainty, a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that amount to nonconsent, combining the lists of factors in ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2). The
provisions that relate to the age of consent could also be included, so
as to clearly indicate that age is a prerequisite to capacity where the
accused is outside the close in age exceptions. These factors should be
seen as negating consent, not vitiating it.
Even with a more robust statutory definition of non-consent and a
clear list of factors that negate consent, there may still be a need for the
common law to provide for vitiation of a voluntary and capable
consent where the complainant maintains that she wanted the sexual
activity to take place. For example, the infliction of serious bodily
harm in a sexual context may be a situation in which consent is
vitiated for reasons of public policy, but only where the complainant
asserts that she wanted the specific sexual activity that caused the
bodily harm to take place. Where more force was used than was
consented to, there is no consent and vitiation plays no part. This
limits the concept of vitiation to specific situations where the risk of
harm or exploitation makes voluntary agreement insufficient. In
other words, vitiation should be limited to cases where we are
overriding an otherwise voluntary and capable consent for public
policy reasons. It should not be used to tell a woman that she
subjectively agreed to sexual activity that, in her mind, she did not
want to take place.
GF was not a complicated case, particularly once the evidence of
the accused was rejected. The complainant was 16 years old,
intoxicated to the point of being ill, and did not want to have sex
with her mother’s coworkers. She behaved in a manner entirely
consistent with that state of mind and level of impairment. Despite
this straightforward set of facts, the case required three levels of court
to secure the convictions of the accused, three sets of reasons at the
Supreme Court of Canada, and a detailed attempt to reconcile and
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explain the law on non-consent and incapacity to consent. It is time to
bring coherence to the law of sexual consent by grounding the
definition in an understanding focused on whether the complainant
wanted the sexual activity to take place, and reflecting that definition
in a unified set of statutory provisions on non-consent.

